A comparative view of the Panama and San Blas routes for an interoceanic canal

A COMPARATIVE VIEW

OF THE

PANAMA >ND SAN BLAS ROUTES

FOR AN

INTEROCEANIC CANAL,

BY

SIDNEY F. SHELBOUEE"E.

NEW YORK, MARCH, 1880.

1

I

nn3

INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL ARGUMENT.

For which of you, intending to build a tower, sitteth not down first^

and counteth the cost, whether he have sufficient to finish it?

Lest haply, after he hath laid the foundation, and is not able to finish
it, all that behold it begin to mock him.

After the dreams and speculations of more than three centuries, civiliza-
tion and progress have at last reached a generation in which an inter-oceanic
canal, through the American Isthmus, is destined to be an accomplished

Before us, for solution, is the grave question of where, how, by whom,
and at what cost this work is to be achieved? A distinguished and honored
citizen of France thinks he has already answered this question, and has put
himself at the head of a scheme for its realization. Indeed, so confident is
he, that at a recent banquet in his honor he said: " Science has declared in
uivor of this (Panama) canal. I am Science, or rather I follow Science." This
Napoleonic declaration, however aptly it may illustrate the situation at Suez
when that project was undertaken, has no fitting accord with the circum-
stances of to-day.

At Suez, there was but one way and one project possible. Science,
therefore, could make no mistakes at Suez, and the followers of science had
nothing to do but to look straight before them. The opposition at Suez was
necessarily directed against science and civilization and progress, and was
bound to fail; it was an opposition, not to a particular choice of a canal, but to
any canal. It is to be feared that success at Suez against great and prolonged
opposition has given an unwarranted confidence and self-resolution to the
promoter of that enterprise. That scheme was proposed and launched with
the rising sun and glory of Napoleon III. Paris was being rehabilitated and
adorned with works of private utility and public grandeur under the admin-
istration of the energetic Baron Hausmann. France was swept, from her
capital to her borders, by an awakened impulse of ambition and glory.
Her new Emperor, as one of the allies against Russia, was even then reaping
for her a questionable share ofmilitary glorv in the East.

Saying, this man began to build, and was not able to finish.

St. Luke, xiv, 28 seq^.

Aperire terram gentibus^^ aut tenebras argento. — Script.

fact.

2

The French people had not forgotten the political ambitions of the first
Napoleon in Egypt and Syria, nor the scientific results of his expedition
thither. In that attempt England had been the enemy of France, and even
to the recent day of the Paris Exposition and the war with Germany, a
chronic animosity has pervaded the Frencli people against the English.
Here' was Egypt, the next door neighbor of the French across the Mediterra-
nean to the East and South, while the island seat of Britain was on the
opposite side of France, across the sea to the North. What better or greater
or surer victory was there for the French people, against the opposing
English, than to fall in behind the banner of science and glory, borne by the
sturdy hand of Lesseps, and march with their francs and their centimes in
the honored service of x»eace through the desert wastes where the Pharaohs
had left their crowns.

But we turn to the American Isthmus and find a different problem. The
French and the people of the United States are old-time allies and friends.
This is a new world of physical and political geography. It is marked by
traversing a great curve of the earth across a mighty ocean. France, in the
days of her early friendship and magnanimity, sold to us her continental
possessions on our borders and gathered herself, where the hearts of all
Frenchmen return, to her Gallic home. And, if her Napoleons, whose am-
bition the half of the earth could not bound, did essay their schemes to
occupy and govern on our southw^estern borders, chastened and republican
France may not be charged with the wrong to-day. There has not been, nor
can there be, discovered in the French people, as a mass, any self -born dis-
position to address their political schemes or their financial attentions
towards the States or the projects of our new world. The political intui-
tions, the financial caution, and the economic methods of the French people
will cause them to examine very carefully into the disposition of their sav-
ings in any project so far from their customary investments, and so exposed
to dangers, before they will consent to part with them.

We shall not, however, here discuss the Monroe doctrine, nor the compli-
cations which may arise with reference to it. W e shall not inquire what nation
will guard this channel to our Pacific coasts and its adjacent seas in time of war,
nor what government will assume to adjust the disputes which may arise be-
tween the Columbian Government and its concessionau'es; nor by what laws
and courts, or where located, the canal company, and the commerce using its
highway, will settle their inevitable disputes. It is enough for us to consider
that the French people will be depended upon by M. de Lesseps to provide
the substantial capital for his Panama project, on the basis of his present
assumed scientific solution. If the French alone were concerned in this
problem, we would leave them to their studies and conclusions. But, as the
problem stands to-day, the commerce of France has an interest in this tran-
sit of less than seven per cent, of the whole. Indeed, it is admitted by M.
de Lesseps that the United States has an interest paramount to that of all the
other nations combined. The question, then, whether M. de Lesseps "is
science, or follows it," is one of vital importance to us as a commercial na-
tion. To this branch of the subject, therefore, will the facts and arguments
here presented be chieflj' directed.

3

It is well understood that M. dc Lcsseps is ii steadfast advocate of a sea-
level canal. This preference, from the first, has been that of the great ma-
jority of thinking men who are acquainted with the subject. Even at a cost
of fifty millions of dollars greater than that of a lock-canal, as through
ISTicaraugua, it is judged that a sea-level canal would still be the most eco.
nomical and advantageous. If, therefore, a sea-level canal were only possible
at Panama, and a lock canal through Nicaraugua, the favor to be given the
one or the other of these routes would be determined, the other elements
being balanced, by the comparative question of cost. But when it is recog.
nized that there is a sea-level route other than the Panama, there justly and
fairly arises a contest of merits which demands our consideration and judg-
ment. Ko sincere and upright man, free from a bias of material interest,
could admit other than the choice of a route, all things considered, abso-
lutely the cheapest and the best. One canal commenced on the American
Isthmus by the present generation would prevent the undertaking of another
for a century to come; and a mistake now, at the beginning, would involve
incalculable consequences to the world. But to return to the material argu-
ment from a national point of view. The preponderating concern of the
commerce of the United States in such a canal has a right to demand that it
shall be built in a manner and place which shall most adequately guarantee
the smallest tax upon our commercial industries, and the greatest safety and
convenience to our shipping. HasM. de Lesseps sought out and regarded these
considerations thus far in the developments of his American enterprise? If the
political considerations held to be of grave importance to the United States,
were blown aside as the veriest chaff, would there not still remain for earnest
national inquiry this question of the vital interests of our commerce? Why
was the tea thrown overboard in Boston harbor, and the American Revolution
commenced ? Could we not have bought the tea taxed without our consent, or
have let it alone? Cannot our commerce either use this canal, built by the
money of Europe without us or in spite of us, or let it alone? No ! Only one
canal is possible. Civilization and commerce demand it for the present gen-
eration and chiefly, as admitted, for American interests. If, therefore, by one
route, a canal, at the sea-level, will cost two hundred millions, and by another,
equally as good or better, one-half that sum, it is the duty of this nation, on
its admitted interest, to see that the cheapest and best is chosen. Our com.
merce should not be compelled to pay a burdensome tax that a needlessly
profligate investment may have its recompense. As a nation we should
foresee that the tolls required to pay an adequate interest upon the one capital
could be reduced by one-half and still pay the same dividends on the smaller
one. But M. de Lesseps assures us that the tonnage dues are limited by the
concession, and he promises us, in advance of his company, that they shall
be fifteen francs, or three dollars per ton. It cannot be understood how any
other authority than the stockholders of the future company can give guar-
antees of limit to the tolls. The concession of the Columbian Government
practically does not do it, for it provides for a measurement of vessels extra-
ordinary enough to compass a tax as large as eight dollars per registered ton.
This measurement is the cubic contents of a parallelopiped determined by
the length and greatest width of a vessel at the water-line, multiplied by its

4

greatest draft of water, at the time of transit. Tims, under the concession,
the steamship "Arizona" could be assessed a toll for a single transit of
thirty thousand and fifty dollars, while her net registered tonnage is but 2,928
tons; thus showing, in this case, a limit, by the concession, reaching to above
ten dollars per registered ton.

Notwithstanding, therefore, any promises in advance, it may be safely
prejudged that the practicable scale of revenue will be crowded to its ut-
most to provide adequate dividends upon the investment involved. In the
light of the argument presented we come, therefore, to inquire what M. de
Lesseps has done to determine, by comparative examination or study, the
route which should be chosen. It is gratifying to be able to quote M. de
Lesseps himself on this point. He has told us through the public press,
since his arrival in New York, what he said months before the Paris Con-
gress, and when the surveys of the Panama route, made by the United
States Government, were not yet before him. He says : " I told Messrs, Wyse
and Reclus, when they made their report on the Darien route, that there
could be no other route than the railroad. If you come back with a favora-
ble report of a sea-level canal on that route I shall favor it." Here was a
route determined upon by M. de Lesseps in advance of any adequate sur-
veys or any sufficient study or examination of other possible routes. Hence,
M. de Lesseps can justly say: " I am science, or rather I follow it."

After the report of Lieut, Wyse and M. Reclus the Paris Congress was called
hy M. de Lessees. Instead of constituting that body on the representative
principle of the national commerce involved, its composition was made up
of seventy-three members from France alone, with her two colonies, Algeria
and Martinique, and sixty-two members from all other countries, twenty in
number, great and small, while of these foreign delegates many did not enter
into the discussions or even attend the Congress. A large number of the
Frenchmen in that Congress were the personal friends and collaborateurs of
M. de Lesseps. It is not surprising, therefore, that of those who gave the
affirmative vote in favor of the Panama route a decisive majority were mem-
bers from France. It follows, therefore, that since the Paris Congress was
a scientific assemblage, and, by its vote, constituted as it was, it gave its indorse-
ment to the Panama route, there is a second conclusive reason why M. de
Lesseps, referring to its decision, may say, " I am science, or rather I follow
it." The San Bias route was still, as now, but partially and indefinitely sur-
veyed. The Chiriqui region, said to be only fifty miles across, remains to-
day an unknown wilderness to the possibilities of canalization. But, not-
withstanding these facts, it is assumed by the supporters of M. de Lesseps to
be conclusive in favor of the Panama route, and enough to slaughter every
competing proposition, to merely refer to the decision of the Paris Congress
as though it was the ultima ratione of science. The Paris Congress, how-
ever, did not vote " after it the deluge," and its constituent elements returned
whence they came.

To make definite this project of a canal, and to explain away any possi-
bilities of mistake or impracticability, it remained to call " the Superior Inter-
national Technical Commission " to formulate, on the Isthmus, in the imme-
diate presence of the obtrusive facts, the plans of a predetermined success.

5

The leading members of this commission are men of honorable character
and scientific reputation. All of them well knew M. de Lesseps' wishes and
determinations. He called them and constituted them his commission.
They were bound, so far as their honest convictions would let them, to pay
deference to his views. M. de Lesseps himself has just told us that " if they
(the commission) Jiad reported in favor of a lock canal, he would have put on
his hat and gone home." In fact, the question of a lock canal was not be-
fore them. It was purely and solely " the Panama sea-level canal " — can it
be built, and how much will it cost? M, de Lesseps hhnself also explained
this when he said, at the reception before the Society of Civil Engineers:
''I did not go to the Isthmus to examine other routes. I went simply to
carry out the decision of the Paris Congress." This, then, was his purpose,
and the object of the " Superior Commission " he took with him. The de-
cision of the Paris Congress was embodied in the following resolution:
"Resolved, That the International Congress is of the opinion that the con-
struction of an inter-oceanic canal of continuous level, so desirable in the in-
terests of commerce and navigation, is possible, and that the maritime canal,
to respond to the indispensable facilities of access and usefulness which a
passage of this kind would offer, should proceed from the Gulf of Limon to
the Bay of Panama."

Upon this resolution M. de Lesseps sought to obtain his capital and failed.
The Paris Congress declared that the Panama canal " is possible." This was
not enough for the capitalists. The " Superior Technical Commission " is
thereupon called to fix the details to the "possible," and to reckon up the
cost. As faithful engineers, they have performed simply an engineer's dut}^
and have reported that the " possible " can be accomplished, with such and
Buch details, at an engineering cost of so many francs. To M. de Lesseps,
apparently, the problem seems now conclusive, and triumph is assured. He
may now say: "This commission has made the project definitive for the
capitalists. They will surely receive these /ac^s with enthusiasm "

A brief review^ will show a consecutive line of logical events. First, that
long before the Paris Congress M. de Lesseps had determined in favor of the
Panama route, and, before any definitive or comparative surveys were availa-.
ble, had said to Messrs. Wyse and Reclus, on their starting for the Isthmus:
"If you come back and report in favor of the route by the railroad I will
support you." Hence, arose his first title to his banquet declaration: " I am
science, or rather I follow it."

Second. That the Paris Congress was called by M. de Lesseps, and com-
posing it were seventy-three Frenchmen to sixty-two members of all other
nations; that ujDon general considerations, and without any detailed plans of
the Panama project before it, but only shifting propositions, it arrived at the
very conclusion of M. de Lesseps. A sea-level canal "is possible," and
the place is Panama. Hence, is due his second title to the declaration: " I
am science, or rather I fojlqw it."

Third. The work and ^he report of .M. de Lesseps' " Superior Technical
Commission," declaring an engineer's "possibility" at a determinate cost,
based upon (comparative?) science, which is to be the grand and triumphant
salute to the capitalists. In this arises the third title to the declaration: "I
am science, or rather \ fpUq^v it."

6

Thinking men may reasonably inquire whether M. de Lesseps, duriDg his
long residence in Egypt and Syria, has not developed unconsciously into a
magic producer of the apples of Sodom — that Dead-Sea fruit so fair and
beautiful — and whether he is not now holding up to his own fancy, and toy-
ing the vision of his friends with a specimen of that product rare in size
and rich and perfect in its color and smoothness? If such is the case it
would be a rude and ungracious work to probe beneath the fair surface of a
fruit so comely to the eye, were it not that the bearings of the subject in
hand are too important to permit of any sentiment upon surface, or even to
regard the courtesies usually due to the claims of a clever magician. Let us,
therefore, try to find the meat beneath the magnificent rind "the com*
mission" has polished upon this Panama scheme.

It has been already said that the report of the " commission," which,
after all, is the only tangible fact of the entire American effort of M. de Les-
seps, is merely a declaration of quantity and price, and that the commission
intended to limit itself to this alone. It may be profitable to observe how
this appears, from the declarations of some of the members of the commis-
sion, when giving their opinions as men unharnessed from the yoke of
their profession. In an interview reported in the New York Herald, August
10th, 1879, Col. G. M. Totten replied to questions wifji reference to the
Panama route, as follows:

Ques. " Do you regard this as a practicable route?"
Ans. " While it is generally understood that a sea-level canal is imprac-
ticable by the Nicaraugua route, it is not so well known that the Chagres
River, and its tributaries, present insuperable obstacles to a sea-level canal
by the Panama route."

Ques. " What is the most feasible route, in your judgment?"
Ans. " The San Bias route is the most feasible known sea-level route?"
Gen, Wright, in an elaborate article over his own signature, reported in
the Herald of October 22d, 1879, says of the Panama route :

"The plan of building without lift-locks is the one I advocated before
making a thorough investigation of the subjeet; but since then I have aban-
doned it on account of two almost insuperable obstacles which presented
themselves, namely — first, the great cost of construction; and, second, the al-
most impossiUUty of maintaining such a canal. The feasible plan, then, is to
use lift-locks on both sides of the summit."

Upon their arrival in Kew York from the Isthmus, both Herr. Dirks and
Gen. Wright were interviewed by representatives of the press. One of
the questions to Mr. Dirks was as follows: Ques. " Will European capital-
ists invest in such a vast work?" Ans. "Ah! You ask something which is
not in my province as an engineer."

Among others, the following question was put to Gen. Wright: Ques.
"Do you think the canal will be profitable at the estimated cost?" Ans.
" That is something which we, as engineers, were not called upon to answer,
nor say; it will take so long to build and will cost so much."

It will be seen, therefore, in the light of the foregoing, that the founda-
tion of practicability in the Panama scheme is chiefly, if not entirely, the
hope and resolution of M. de Lesseps himself.

7

We have come, then, to the solution of the question we have already pro-
pounded, namely: What M. de Lesseps has done to determine exhaustively
the route which should be chosen? It is to be regretted that the reply must
be — absohitely nothing. He has not addressed himself, from first to last, to
any comparative surveys. He has not seemed to care that they should be
made, even by others, for his words to Messrs. Wyse and Reclus were in
effect a suggestion that they should abandon other routes for the one he h ad-
predetermined. He has pursued, from ignorance through what light may
have come to him of Isthmus topography, the one set resolution — his first
and fixed determination that he will have nothing else but the Panama rout(!.

But, while he has done nothing towards the choice of a route, the world is
still largely indebted to him for such an exposition of the Panama route for
a sea-level canal as will enable those familiar with the comparative methods
of science to place before the capitalists of the world the scheme of M. de
Lesseps on the basis of its real merits; and that, too, with the advantage of
using his own figures in the showing.

PHYSICAL FEATUEES AND ESTIMATES.

First— LENGTH.

The Panama route, as determined by M. de Lesseps' commission, will be
forty-five miles long from sea to sea. The San Bias route has a total
length of thirty miles, or only two-thirds that of Panama.

Second-length of canalization.

The Panama route will require an artificial cutting for the whole forty-
five miles. The San Bias route for only 24 miles, thus reducing the actual
canal to nearly one-half the length of the Panama. The Bayano River
already affords ehip navigation for six miles on the Pacific side at San Bias.

Third— HARBORS.

The Panama route has indifferent harbors on both sides of the Isthmus,
The destruction of ships at Aspinwall last November illustrates this point.
Here it is proposed to wall in a harbor by an immense breakwater, more than
a mile and a quarter long, at a cost of two million dollars. This expense is
entirely avoided on the Atlantic side at San Bias, where there is an inclosed
natural bay and harbor of nine square miles of secure anchorage.

On the Pacific side the Panama route ends in the open ocean bay of Pan-
ama, with a cutting of submarine rock to reach deep water. The cutting of
the Pacific end of the San Bias route ends in the Bayano river, which affords
for six miles an anchorage ground, two miles of which has a width of half a
mile. The Island of Chepillo, two and a half miles off, in the Bay of Pana-
ma, from the mouth of the l^ayano, affords a perfect protection against th§
stormy violence of tli§ §§^?

8

FouRTH-E^TERFERINO CHANNELS OF NATURAL DRAINAGE.

On the San Bias route there are absolutely none. On the Atlantic side the
canal commences at Mandinga Harbor, and extends five miles through a grad-
ual upward slope to the mouth of the proposed tunnel — on the Pacific side from
the opening of the tunnel through an easy downward slope to the Bayano
river, a distance of twelve miles. On both sides of the mountain the small
streams run parallel with the proposed canal. The Panama route presents
the situation of an extensive system of river drainage, of which the Chagres
occupies the central and most prominent position. Crossing the line of the
proposed canal, and emptying into this river on the one side, are twenty-one
smaller rivers and streams between the two points of Matachin and v^atun.
Between Gatun and Limon Bay the river Mindi and its principal branch are
crossed. Between Matachin and the Bay of Panama the Obispo and the Bio
Grande, both important rivers, with their several branches, are encountered.
This situation of water courses presents, indeed, the most stupendous prob-.
lem of engineering as connected with this route. It involves a gigantic dam
costing twenty millions of dollars. It requires an artificial channel for these
various rivers on the one side and the other of the central ship canal — in fact
three canals side by side to be created by the hand of man.

With these features in view, the determination between a sea level canal
at San Bias or at Panama ought to be easy enough. There is yet to be found
a single American engineer who will stake his personal reputation upon the
declaration that a sea-level canal at Panama is possible in the present genera-
tion at a practicable cost. There are doubtless scores of engineers who, with
Col. Totten and Gen. "Wright, will be able to tell us how the canal can be
built with drill and spade and masonry, and how much it will cost ; the de-
terminations, therefore, in favor of this route are not yet complete. Capital-
ists, who are the shrewd and calculating judges of practicability, have yet to
give their decision.

Fifth— WIDTH OF CANAL.

It will be seen that M. de Lessepshas confined the width of his proposed
canal to the minimum. This was doubtless necessary, in his mind, to keep
its cost within the limits of the banker's arithmetic. A compromise was
expedient to bring the "possible" somewhere near at least to the appear-
ance of the practicable. This method of reduction towards practicability
becomes interesting in view of the fact that Col. Totten, while on the Isth-
mus, gave to the correspondent of the New York Herald an estimtate
of the cost of a sea-level open-cut canal at Panama, of a width on the bot-
tom of 106 feet in earth and 120 feet in rock, at four hundred and twenty-nine
million dollars. But the width at bottom assigned by the report of the com-
mission is only seventy-two feet, except in the deep rock cutting of the
Culebra section, where it is 78.75 feet.

In the calculations hitherto and elsewhere made for the San Bias route,
the writer has estimated for a tunnel 100 feet wide and 168 feet high, and for
an open cutting of 100 feet wide on the bottom. It becomes, therefore, now
necessary, in giving a just comparison between the two routes under consid-

9

eration, to reduce the proportions of the line by San Bias to those just as-
signed by the de Lesseps commission for the Panama route. The following
are the dimensions assigned by the commission for the Panama route:

1. Between Colon and kilometre 36 (the Atlantic division), and between
kilometre 61 and Panama (the Pacific Division):

Width at bottom. 22 metres

Width at water line 50

Depth 8.50

3. Between kilometres 36 and 61 (the Culebra or Summit division):

Width at bottom .,24 metres

Width at water line 28

Depth 9 "

The dimensions herein following, therefore, for the San Bias route, while
about the same for the earth sections, give the canal for the rock sections a
width at bottom of 1.25, and at the water line of two feet, greater than those
for the Panama route.

Sixth— QUANTITIES.

The quantities reported by the commission for the Panama canal sum
up a total of seventy-five million cubic metres. A cubic metre = 1,308-|-
cubic yards; therefore, the total is 98,100,000 cubic yards. This enor-
mous total does not include tlic excavation necessary to provide new
channels for the rivers on each side of the canal, and for which, without
giving quantities, the commission assigned a cost of seventy-five mill-
ion francs. We must, therefore, necessarily leave out from our compar-
ison of quantities a considerable and important element. And yet of this
total for the central canal the rock alone equals the entire to'^al of both rock
and earth excavation for the San Bias route, being 35,345,000 cubic metres,
or 46,231,260 cubic yards; while the earth is an addition of 39,655,000 cubic
metres, or 51,868,740 cubic yards.

The rock excavation in a single division of the Panama route (the Culebra
or Summit section) amounts to 33,789,564 cubic yards, which is within a
fraction of being twice the whole amount of the seven miles of tunnel excava-
tion on the San Bias route; and yet M. de Lesseps holds up this tunnel as
something enormous and difficult to excavate. But while M. de Lesseps
says this, men like Walter Siianl}^ whose life long experience has been in
tunneling work, saj'' that each cubic 3'ard of it, when once the small heading
is driven, is only equivalent to a cubic yard in M. de Lesseps's project, with
the advantage that there is always a roof over the work in progress, and, un-
hindered by storms or night, it may proceed through every hour of the year.

But that each one who chooses may make, in detail, the comparisons for
himself, tlic quantities estimated for the San Bias route are here given:

ATLANTIC DIVISION.
First Section op Two Miles,
Commencing at Mandinga Harbor, Gulf of San Bias. Average surface
elevation above mean low water, 20 feet. Excavation:, earth. Composl-

10

lion — alluvium and clay of decomposition; ferruginous. Width at bottom,
72 feet. Slopes, below water, 1^ to 1 ; above, 1 to 1.

FORMULAS OP CALCULATION.

Excav. below water.
72+73+3 (28)

X28X5280X2 J- -t-27

Lav. above water. ^ ^=2,635,138 c. yds. earth.
156+156+2 (20)
X 20X5380X2

Second Section of Two Miles.

Average surface elevation above the sea, 80 feet. Excavation: rock
and earth. Average layer of earth, 20 feet. Width at bottom, in rock, 80
feet. Slopes, in rock, ^ to 1; in earth, 1 to 1.

FORMULAS OP CALCULATION.

For the rock.
80+80+ (88-T-2) )

X88X5280X2 [ -?-27=3,510,613 c. yds. rock.

2 )
For the earth.
80+44+3 (30)+ 124

X20X5380X3 \ -5-37=1,136,400 c. yds. earth.

I -5-37=]

Third Section op One Mile to the Mouth of the Tunnel.

Average elevation above the sea, 162 feet. Conditions as to rocK and
earth in second section.

FORMULAS OP CALCULATION.

For the rock.
80+80+ (170-^2) )

X170X5380 [ -f-27=4,073,445 c. yds. rock.

^ \

For the earth.
80+85+3 (20)+165 )

— ^ -X30X5380 [ -r-37=733,556 c. yds. of earth.

Total for the division— rock, 7,583,058 c. yds; earth, 4,475,094 c. yds.

Note. — The elevations for this division have been taken at 10 per cent, above the ap-
proximate calculable maximum.

MIDDLE DIVISION.

The Tunnel Through the Cordilleras.

Length, 7 miles Width at bottom and surface of water, 80 feet. Height
from bottom, 168 feet; above water, 140 feet. Area of vertical section by
planometer, on scale drawing of 10 feet to 1 inch, 13,402 sq. feet, or 1,378
sq. yds.

11

Therefore, 12,402x5280x7-^27=16,976,960 cubic yards, the total excava-
tion for the middle division.

PACIFIC DIVISIOK
FiKST Section of One Mile.
Commencing at Pacific end of tunnel. Average elevation above low sea
in Gulf of San Bias — the datum level of construction — 122 feet. Conditions
of rock and earth as in second section, Atlantic Division.

FORMULAS OF CALCULATION.

c. yo8. rock.

For the rock.
80+80+(130^2)

. hl30X5280

2

For the farlh.
80+65+2(20) +145
X20X5280

-27=2,860,000
c. yds. earth.
-r-27= 626,815

.Total, 3,486,815 c. yds.

Second Section, Seven Miles.

Average elevation above low sea, 37.75. Conditions of rock and earth as
in second section, Atlantic Division.

FORMULA FOR DEPTH OF CUTTING,

67.5+8+2(28)
==65.75.

Total e. yds,
=9,087,048.

FORMULAS OP CALCULATION.

For the rock. c, yds. rock.

80+80+(45. 75-^2) )

X45. 75X5280X7 )■ -5-27=5,726,426

3 )

For the earth. c. yds. earth.

80+(45.75-^2)+2(20)+102,87 )

X20X5280X7 V -^-27=3,360,622

2 )

Third Section of Four Miles to Bayano River.

Average elevation above low sea, 16 feet; or 23,5 above low water in
the Bay of Panama. Excavation: earth. Width and slopes as in first sec-
tion, Atlantic Division.

FORMULAS of calculation.

Exeav. below water.
72+72+3(28) )

X28x5280x4 ^-i-27

3 )

Excav. above water.
72+3(:28)+2(16)+156
XlOX 5280X4 ^-^27

=4,649,529 c. yds. earth.

J

Total excavation. Pacific Division— Rock, 8,686,426; earth, 8,536,966.

Note.— The elevations ara calculated on the basis of a rise and fall of tide of two feet in
the Gulf ef San Bias, ai>d of seve^teeu feet in the Bay of Pauama.

12

RECAPITULATION.

Atlantic Division Rock, 7,583,058 ^r^A, 4,475,094 c. yds.

Middle " " 16,976,960 "

Pacific " " 8,586,426 '* 8,636,966

Grand total 33,146,444 18,112,060

Combined total 46,258,504

The quantities here estimated for the San Bias route have been arrived
at after carefully collating all the accessible data of this route, and by cal-
culations entirely independent of any hitherto made, and their justness and
yet liberality is shown by the fact that they exceed by about two million
cubic yards the quantities assigned for this route by Messrs. Wyse and
Reclus in their presentation of it before the Paris Congress.

It may be of value to present here that the quantities estimated for the
Nicaragua route are 59,883,557 cubic yards, adopting the cross section of the
surveys; but, taking the cross section assumed by the Paris Congress, to
equalize the calculations for the several routes, the quantities are 70,781,555
cubic yards. Therefore, to the fact that the San Bias route is by far the
shortest of all possible routes, must be added the second great fact, that the
quantities of excavation are far less than those of imy other route, emn to
being less than lial t the quantitien of the Panama route.

In so important a matter these facts will not fail of attention.

Seventh— COMPARISON OF COST.

It will not be necessary here to reduce to exact dollars and cents every
detail of the estimates in francs for the Panama route. It is enough
to say that the engineer's total, as an engineer's estimate, was 843 million
francs, or $168,600,000, and that this sum is wholly absorbed in en-
gineering items. But M. de Lesseps is committed to pay the sharehold-
ers five per cent, interest on their money advanced, until one year after
the completion of the canal. This item alone will add $37,935,000 to the
above sum. Then there is $14,000,000, at least, to be paid for the Pana-
ma Railroad by the time of the completion of the canal. Again, there must
be added $2,000,000 to Lieut, Wyse and his associates, on account of the con-
cession. Also $2,000,000 to M. de Lesseps himself, for his advances as de-
posits for the Columbian Government, and for the surveys and studies now
in progress on the Isthmus. We see, then, that if the engineer's estimate is
high enough, and all goes well with the work, and bankers and agents get
nothing as commissions for their part, the capitalization of this scheme, at
the completion of the canal, upon which dividends must be earned, is the
enormous sum of $224,535,000.

But M. de Lesseps says his Commission estimated too high. Why not
say, on the contrary, too low ? If M. de Lesseps is to have his own judg-
ment or speculation about it, why have had the Commission at all ? The
writer has hitherto estimated open cut rock excavation on the Isthmus at
$3 per cubic yard; but M. de Lesseps' Commission, adopting the figures for-

13

mulated by a Committee of the Paris Congress, has placed the cost at twelve
francs per cubic metre, which is only $1.77 per cubic yard.

But it is not the purpose to criticize tiie prices fixed by the de Lesseps
Commission, but simply to apply them in comparison to the quantities for
the San Bias route.

Here is the schedule of the Commission, affixed to the quantities for the
Panama route, in its general statement:

FRANCS.

1st. Earth, 27 350,000 c. m., at 2.50 francs, approximately 68,760,000

Rocks of mean hardness, 825,000 c. m., at 7 francs 5,775,000

Hard rocks, 27,734,000 c. m., at 12 francs 332,808,000

Excavation of rocks where pumping is necessary, 6,409,000

c. m., at 18 francs 115,362,000

Dred2:ing and excavation under water, mud and alluvial

soil, 12,005,000 c. m. , at 2.50 francs 30,500,000

Hardsell, capable of being dredged, 300.000 c. m., at 12

francs 3,600,000

Excavations of rocks underwater, 377,000 c. m., at 35

Francs 13,195,000

2d. Dam at Gamboa, length, 1,600 m., maximum height, 40 m. 100,000,000
3d. Channels for discharging the water of the regulated

Chagres, the Obispo, and the Trinidad " 75,000,000

4th. Tide lock, on the Pacific side 12,000,000

5th. Breakwater, at the Bay of Limon 10,000,000

767,000,000

6th. Add for contingencies 76,000,000

Total (francs) 843,000,000

It will be observed that there are three items in the above schedule —
namely, the second, third and fifth — involving an estimate, with the percent-
tage for contingencies, of a large total of 203,500,000 francs, which have no
relation or application to the estimates for the San Bias route. Therefore,
this large sum must afford a further illustration of the declaration of M. de
Lesseps " I am science, or rather I follow it."

Applying the above schedule of prices to the quantities for the San Bias
route, and giving items not identical for the two routes, a liberal estimate,
the result will be as follows :

DOLLARS.

1st. 8,207,858 c. yds. of rock where pumping is required, at 18

francs per c. m., or $2.65.5 per c. yd 21,791,863

492,800 c, yds. rock, in tunnel heading, of section of 40 sq.

yds. to 1 lineal, at $9 per c. yd , 4,435,200

24,445,786 c. yds. open cut rock in tunnel and outside, at 12

francs per cm., or $1.77 per c.yd 43,269,041

13,112,060 c. yds. alluvial soil, dredged from below water,
and surface earth excavated above the rock, at 2.50

francs per c. m., or 37 cents per c. yd 4,851,462

2d. Tide lock, on the Pacific side 2,400,000

3(1. Deepening bar and dredging, in Bayano River 600,000

4th. Sinking 3 shafts to tunnel 460,000

5th. Light house on Chepillo Island..., 15,000

$77,822,566

6th. Add for contin.n:encies 7,782,256

Total

14

For the purposes of this comparison, there is nothing to be added to the
above estimates, except for tlie contingent cost of replacing an unstable
natural arch with an artificial and safe one in portions of the tunnel. With
tunnels already constructed, we know that the percentage is below one-
sixth of the length. Therefore, a contingent assignment of four million dol-
lars would meet the objection that we had not made an allowance for arch-
ing the tunnel.

The figures given, showing that, upon equal conditions, the cost of a
sea-level canal by the San Bias route would be approximately only one-half
that of the proposed Panama canal, can lead to but one conclusion. Half
the cost of construction means twice the profits, or only half the tolls.

Eighth— AN IMPORTANT QUESTION OF DETAIL.

The situation of the Panama route, with its extended system of drainage
channels, makes it absolutely necessary that the outflow to the sea of the
drainage of the water sheds Should be provided for in advance of the con-
struction of the main ship canal. Of course, it is proposed to dig a new
channel for the various streams on each side of the line of the main canal.
Standing, then, at the Bay of Colon, we see befoie us the central depression
of the valley of the Chagres — the line of ship transit. To the left we see an
artificial channel cut for the " regulated " Chagres, the Obispo, the Gatun,
and eighteen smaller streams. To the right we see a new artificial way for
the Rio Baila Monos, the Trinidad, the Rio Mandingo, and many others of
lesser note. If, in cutting these subsidiary channels, the material has been
disposed of to the right and left of each respectively, as may, perhaps, be
done, the next question which comes to be considered is the disposition of
the material of excavation of the main canal itself. Is it possible to find
an easier w^ay of disposition than to carry every cubic yard of it to a dis-
tance across the new rivers on either side — and can there ])e found room for
so large an excavation? The practical engineer will study with grave
doubts, if not with nightmare, a problem so filled with the elements of delay,
of difiiculty, and of cost.

Ninth— FAIR WEATHER, AND WET AND DRY SLOPES.

All explorers of the Isthmus agree that the Pacific is the fair and dry side,
and the Atlantic the stormy and wet side. While the change in the climate in
passing from one side to the other, in a region so low of summit and broken
in character as between Panama and Aspinwall, may not be clearly appar-
ent, in other portions of the Isthmus, as at San Bias, where the mountain
range is unbroken and the elevation much greater, the change is at once sud-
den and remarkable.

Of wet slope and Atlantic climate, the Panama route would have thirty-
five miles — the San Bias route, five miles.

Counting the tunnel as neutral, the dry slope and Pacific climate of the
San Bias route would be eigliteen miles, while that of the Panama route
would be only ten miles. Comparing the Atlantic slopes of the two routes,
it will be seen that the disadvantage is as 7 to 1 against the Panama route.

15

How much this speaks, in dollars and cents, of workmen huddled in their
huts, of doctors' chests, stacked spades, ami swelling rivulets surprising
each other tlirough the new-dug earth, is a calculation too uncertain for
oflSce mathematics, and must he left to the arithmetic of the superintend-
ant's note book.

The quick mind of the capitalist, however, can grasp this element, with-
out figures, and give it proper weight in the problem to be solved.

Tenth— THE QUESTION OF TIME.

Much has been said by M. de Lesseps and others about the immense ad-
vantage tliey would gain in time of construction, as well as cost, by the use
of the Panama Railroad. M. de Lesseps even gave to a reporter on the Isth-
mus, the statement that what they had accomplished towards the survey in
little more than one month, w^ould have taken a year without the trans-
portation of the Panama Railroad. Such exaggerations do not bring-
either credence or friends to any cause. There can be no doubt that the
Panama Railroad would be a material help in the construction of a canal,
even so short as 45 miles; and the argument based on this fact is
worth consideration w^hen the opposing proposition is a canal of a
length of 181 miles, as that through Nicaragua. But the argument has
no application to San Bias. Here we have a magnificent liarbor, per-
fectly protected, which does not need a costly breakwater as at Aspin-
wall. A pile wharf, the work of thirty days, would alford all the facilities
for landing machinery. The opening to be made is immediately before us,
and the rrouth of the proposed tunnel only five miles distant. The work
of providing this five miles with a railway for the transportation of machin-
ery and supplies could be completed in the time it would take to construct
the machinery and get it to the Isthmus.

On the Pacific side, the mouth of the tunnel is only eight miles from deep
water navigation. A.nd yet, notwithstanding these facts, the entourage of
M. de Lesseps will persist in telling us that it will take twelve years to con-
struct a canal by the San Bias route, for toant of transportation and the dif-
ficulties of the tunnel. Transportation and the tunnel are their reiterated
objections.

Moreover, M. de Lesseps himself has said that after the tunnel is built,
ship owners would not use it. This is evidently merely the opinion of M. de
Lesseps himself; but since he said at the Paris Congress that he embodied
the public sentiment on the canal subject, and in New York that he is " sci-
ence", and immediately telegraphed to Paris for publication that, "At the
great banquet our enterprise w^as unanimously and enthusiatically adopted,"
— " Uiie adhesion enthunaste et unanime d notre enterprise a He exprimte," —
and later, from Washington, that the President's message assured the success
of the (Panama?) canal, sound judging men must surely come to think
that what M. de Lesseps saj^s, feels, or perhaps even dreams, is the wx
populi, if not the mx Dei,

Here is a tunnel, the contents of which are less than 17 millions cubic
yards of rocks. A single division of the Panama route has almost exactly

16

twice as much. Tunnel work in Europe is now proceeding at the rate of 13
feet per day in a single heading, and at one-third the cost of fifteen years
ago. Every advance of a hundred feet of this heading will lay open the
whole large floor-work in that distance of the great excavation. If, then,
men enough can be found, the whole excavation can follow close upon the
lieading. The rainy season, the nights and the showers, will deter the work
on the route of M . de Lesseps. The roof of the tunnel will make for San
Bias one long season of progress, of even temperature, from the beginning to
the end of the year. These facts considered, will any one be bold enough to
say that it will take twelve years to perform at San Bias an excavation equal
to one-half the vnoxkoi a singe division of the Panama route? Would it
not rather be the compliment of sober sense to hold that if eight years are
required for the work of the Panama Canal, the like construction at San
Bias could be accomplished in six?

Eleventh— COST OF MAINTENANCE.

The whole of the Atlantic section of the Panama Canal would be
a continual source of apprehension to shipowners using it. There would
be the dangers of the loose and unstable soil which embanks, on
either side, the new channels of the various rivers, and the irrup-
tion of these embankments into the main canal in times of floods. In
the long rainy season, the insidious elements would be everywhere at
work. There would be water everywhere — above — around — beneath. The
softening, the settling, and sliding of everything built up, or held up, of
earth, would be inevitable. To these conditions, in the mind of the sailor,
there would be added the constantly impending danger of the giving
way of the wall which holds back a Noah's flood of waters. There would
be the waslidown of the sides of the main canal itself which must neces-
sarily receive the rainfall between the ridges of elevation on either side, sepa-
arating it from its supplementary channels. In a word, there would be here a
constant and powerful movement of nature to put again at the lowest levels
what the shovels of the workmen had thrown up to the highest. The force
necessary to continually watch and repair this effort of nature, operating in
loose materials, would make the maintenance of this canal a most costly bur-
den. At San Bias there would be a continuous rock-lined, rock-bound
channel from one end of the cutting to the other, and no drainage rivers or
sliding embankments to fear. Therefore, a comparison in this caption must
put all the small figures on the side of San Bias, and all the large ones on
that of Panama. How the problem actually stands no one can determine
in advance, because no one can prejudge how much it will cost to maintain a
sea-level canal on the Panama route. But, on the score of length alone,
without considering the multitude of doubtful elements against the Panama
route, the San Bias route has the clear advantage of one-thii'd in its favor— or,
as thirty to forty-five.

Twelfth-towage AND USEFULNESS.

The processes of logic will find no difficulties with this topic. The cost
of towage through a sea-level canal of thirty miles will only be two-thkds as

1?

much as the same service through "a similar sea-level canal of a length of
forty-five miles. It follows, too, inevitably, that a proportionably larger
number of ships per day can pass through the shorter canal than through
the longer one, under the same conditions.

Thirteenth— PAYING TONNAGE.

It is not. the purpose here to reckon up and present a statement of the
tonnage which can be Counted upon to pay tolls to a sea-ievel canal through
the American Isthmus. Others have already, with too much haphazard,
essayed this task. We shall be satisfied just now to point out the consid-
eration that, an exiding tonnage, which would mildew the investments of
M. de Lesseps, might still pay a reasonable interest on a capital of half his
ambition.

CONCLUBION.

It may be queried b}^ those little acquainted with the problem of an inter-
oceanic ca,nal, whether tliis effort is not directed with unnecessary discourtesy
towards M. de Lesseps. We reply that there is no motive of personality or
ungracious criticism. M. de Lesseps deserves the thanks and the honor
of all men of progress. In diplomacy and the Suez Canal he has achieved
an enduring fame. We admire him. not so much for his active brain, as for
those qualities found in most successful men, his courage and his tenacity of
purpose. When these qualities were directed in the only possible channel
of science through the desert Isthmus, there was a readj^ recognition of his
progress and success by the American public. If success, and the fame it
brought him, have also given him a giddy judgment and a self-assumed po-
tency in his present attempt, he alone is responsible. We believe that M.
de Lesseps, in his ambition towards the American Isthmus, has fallen into
a grave mistake. The methods (shall we call them diplomatic) so long
familiar to him in the East and in France have no chance of success with the
hard practical sense of an Anglo-Saxon people.

He therefore miscalculates his problems and lives in a world of self-
centred ideas, born of an ambition to add a last crowning glory to his life.
We say, then, let us honor him for what he has already done, and place him,
where he rightfully belongs, in the niches of fame. But let us not forget,
also, that Nature has made the problem of a sea-level canal through the
American Isthmus one that cannot be solved by a Napoleonic dash, nor will
Science identify herself wilh any man, however great a diplomatist, wiio,
caring nothing for the patient studious and toilsome ways of science, under-
takes to make a coup etat upon it and rule it, instead of being a servant
of it.

If, therefore, in the few pages we have written, an unpleasant light has
been thrown on some of the words and acts of M. de Lesseps, the fault is not
in the light but in the subject it reveals to the judgment of men.

In what we have said there is due no allegiance of interest to any man.

18

Tlie aim has been simply to present the facts. If M de Lesseps shall fail, it
will be because the facts are against him — facts of science — facts of his own
methods— facts of political geography. Of all routes across the Isthmus for
a ship canal the world wants, and means to have, the best. Individual in-
terests and ambitions, whether of money or glory, must give way to this
requirement.

To facilitate a careful comparative study of the merits of the only two
sea-Jevel canal routes through the American isthmus the present effort is
made. There can be no doubt whatever as to the decision of the world
upon the facts.

SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION LIBRARIES

3 ^Dflfl DDE^BEID

nmah TC773.S54
A comparative view of the Panama and San